Practical decoy state method in quantum key distribution with heralded
  single photon source by Wang, Qin et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
10
13
4v
1 
 1
7 
O
ct
 2
00
6
Practical decoy state method in quantum key distribution with
heralded single photon source
Qin Wang1,∗ Xiang-Bin Wang2, and Guang-Can Guo1
1Key Laboratory of Quantum Information, Department of Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China,
Hefei 230026, People’s Republic of China and
2Department of Physics, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
Abstract
We propose a practical decoy state method with heralded single photon source for quantum
key distribution (QKD). In the protocol, 3 intensities are used and one can estimate the fraction
of single-photon counts. The final key rate over transmission distance is simulated under various
parameter sets. Due to the lower dark count than that of a coherent state, it is shown that a
3-intensity decoy-state QKD with a heralded source can work for a longer distance than that of a
coherent state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As is well known that, a two-mode light source, such as the state from a parametric down
conversion (PDC) or a two-mode squeezed state takes a very important role in quantum
information processing (QIP)[1]. Since the two modes always have same number of photons,
one mode can be used to indicate the state of the other, therefore it is also called heralded
single photon source (HSPS). Moreover, recent years, due to its wide applications in many
fields, such as in quantum information and quantum radiometry etc., the technology on how
to efficiently obtain HSPS has been developed to a high level [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
In the past few years, quantum key distribution has attracted extensive attentions for
its unconditional security compared with conversional cryptography [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
However, there still exist some limitations in practice, such as imperfect single source, large
loss channel and inefficient detectors etc.. Under such limitations, one serious threaten to
the security is the so called photon number splitting attack[17, 18, 30]. Fortunately, a
number of methods and proposals have been presented for secure QKD even with these
imperfections. These include the mixed protocol[19], the strong-reference light method[20],
and the decoy-state method[21, 22, 23, 24]. And in this paper, what we are interested with
is the decoy-state method. Firstly, according to the separate result of ILM-GLLP, we can
distill a secure final key even an imperfect source is used, provided that we know the lower
bound of fraction of single photon-counts[21]. The non-trivial problem on how to verify
a tight lower bound was not answered then. Later, Hwang[22] proposed the decoy state
method to verify such a lower faithfully.
After that, decoy state method has been advanced by several researchers [23, 24, 25, 26,
27]. The main idea there is to randomly change the intensity of each pulses among different
values, and then deduce the lower bound of fraction of single-photon counts according to the
observed counts of different intensities. In particular, it has been shown that, one can make
a very tight estimation, i.e., the estimated lower bound is only a bit larger than the true
value therefore a good final key rate can be obtained by only using 3 intensities, 0, µ, µ′[23]
or 4 intensities[25].
However, using the coherent states, the dark count will be significant given a distance
longer than 100 kilometers. Naturally, one may think about using HSPS to decrease the
effect of dark count. In fact, as it has been shown recently, an HSPS can indeed raise the
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distance for QKD if one knows the channel transmittances of each photon number states
exactly[28]. However, knowing these exactly requires using infinite number of intensities.
This seems to be an impossible task in practice. Very recently, it is proposed to use photon-
number-resolving detectors to do decoy-state QKD with HSPS[29].
In this paper, we will propose a practical decoy state method with HSPS. We only need 3
intensities and normal yes-no single-photon detectors at Bob’s side. That is to say, we only
assume the technologies that have already adopted in the existing set-ups.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, starting from the two-mode state, we shall
then present the main result of our protocol, i.e., the lower bound of single-photon counts.
In Sec. III, we estimate the QKD distance of our method in various settings. This work is
concluded in Sec IV.
II. HERALDED SINGLE PHOTON SOURCE
Given a two-mode state of the form
|χ〉 = cosh−1χ
∞∑
n=0
einθtanhnχ|n, n〉. (1)
The averaged photon number in one mode is sinh2χ and we shall use this value to indicate
the pulse intensity, i.e., when we say that we use intensities of 0, µ, µ′ for the two mode state
as described by Eq.(1), we mean that sinh2χ = 0, µ, µ′, respectively.
As indicated in Ref. [30], after triggering out one of a photon pair, the other mode is
basically a thermal field of distribution :
ρx =
1
Ppost(x)
{
dA
1 + x
|0〉〈0|+
∞∑
n=1
[1− (1− ηA)
n]
xn
(1 + x)n+1
|n〉〈n|
}
, (2)
where x is the mean photon number of one mode (before triggering), ηA, dA for the detec-
tion efficiency and dark count rate of Alice’s detector and the post-selection probability is
Ppost(x) =
dA
1+x
+ xηA
1+xηA
. The detectors assumed in our protocol here are threshold detectors,
i.e., the outcome of each individual measurement is either clicking or not clicking.
In the protocol, we request Alice to randomly change the intensities of her pump light
among 3 values, so that the intensity of one mode of the two mode source is randomly
changed among 0, µ, µ′ (and µ′ > µ). We define Yn to be the yield of a n-photon state, i.e.,
the probability that Bob’s detector click whenever Alice sends out state |n〉. We also denote
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the yield state ρµ, ρµ′ by Yµ, Yµ′. In the protocol, one can immediately know the value of
Y0 by watching the counts of vacuum pulses, and one can also know the value of Yµ, Yµ′ by
watching the counts caused by pulses of intensity µ, µ′ respectively. In particular, suppose
there are Nx pulses for state ρx and Nxt of them are triggered. During the time windows of
these Nxt pulses, Bob has observed nx clicks. Then we have Yx = nx/Nxt according to our
definition of yield. We want to deduce the value of Y1 based on the known parameters Y0,
Yµ and Y
′
µ. Similar to the case of coherent states[23], we can verify the lower bound of Y1
by the following constraints:
Y˜µ = Y0
dA
1 + µ
+
∞∑
i=1
Yn [1− (1− ηA)
n]
µn
(1 + µ)n+1
, (3)
and
Y˜µ′ = Y0
dA
1 + µ′
+
∞∑
i=1
Yn [1− (1− ηA)
n]
µ′n
(1 + µ′)n+1
, (4)
and Y˜x = (Nxt/Nx)Yx, x = µ, µ
′. These two equations lead to
(1 + µ)
(
µ′
1 + µ′
)2
Y˜µ − (1 + µ
′)
(
µ
1 + µ
)2
Y˜µ′
= Y0
dA
1 + µ
(
µ′
1 + µ′
)2
− Y0
dA
1 + µ′
(
µ
1 + µ
)2
+ ηAY1
[
µ
1 + µ
(
µ′
1 + µ′
)2
−
µ′
1 + µ′
(
µ
1 + µ
)2]
+
∞∑
n=3
Yn [1− (1− ηA)
n]
[
µnµ′2
(1 + µ)n(1 + µ′2)
−
µ′nµ2
(1 + µ′n(1 + µ2)
]
. (5)
It is easy to see that for any n ≥ 3, µ
nµ′2
(1+µ)n(1+µ′2)
− µ
′nµ2
(1+µ′n(1+µ2)
< 0 given that µ′ > µ.
Therefore Eq.(5) leads to the following inequality:
Y1 ≥
{
µ′
µ
(1 + µ)3Y˜µ −
µ
µ′
(1 + µ′3Y˜µ′ − Y0dA
[
µ′
µ
(1 + µ)2 −
µ
µ′
(1 + µ′2
]}
×
[ηA(µ
′ − µ)]−1 (6)
This gives rise to the fraction of single-photon counts for the triggered pulses of different
intensities by the following formula
∆1(x) =
Y1ηAx
YxPpost(x)(1 + x)2
(7)
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and x can be µ or µ′ here. Also, if we have observed the quantum bit-flip rate (QBER)
for triggered pulses of intensity x is Ex, we can upper bound the QBER value for those
single-photon pulses by
e1 ≤
(1 + x)2ExY˜x − (1 + x)Y0dA/2
Y1ηAx
. (8)
Normally, we use the value from x = µ for a tight estimation of e1. Given all these, we can
use the following formula to calculate the final key-rate of triggered signal pulses:
R ≥
Yµ′Ppost(µ
′)
2
{−f (Eµ′)H2 (Eµ′) + ∆1(µ
′) [1−H2 (e1)]} (9)
where the factor 1
2
comes from the cost of basis miss-match in Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84)
protocol; f(Eµ′) is a factor for the cost of error correction given existing error correction
systems in practice. We assume f = 1.2 here. H2 (x) is the binary Shannon information
function, given by
H2 (x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In an experiment, we only need to observe the values of Y0, Yµ, Yµ′ and E(µ), Eµ′ and
then deduce the lower bound of fraction of single-photon counts and upper bound QBER of
single-photon pulses by the theoretical results and then one can distill the secure final key.
Here our goal is to theoretically estimate the final key rate of our protocol if we really did
the experiment. In principle, whatever possible results can be observed in an experiment. In
evaluating our the efficiency of our protocol theoretically, we shall only consider the normal
case where there is no Eve and we calculate the key rate with respect to distance. In order
to make a faithful evaluation, we first need a model to forecast what values for Y0, Yµ, Yµ′ , Yµ
and E(µ), Eµ′ would be observed if we did the experiment in the case there is no Eve.
After these values are estimated, we can calculate the final key rate by Eq.(9) therefore the
efficiency is evaluated theoretically.
Suppose η is the overall transmittance and detection efficiency between Alice and Bob;
tAB is the transmittance between Alice and Bob, tAB = 10
−αL/10; ηB is the transmittance in
Bob’s side, η = tAB.ηB. Therefore normally, the observed value for Yµ, Yµ′ should be around
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Yx =
1
Ppost(x)
{
dAdB
1 + x
+
∞∑
n=1
[1− (1− ηA)
n]xn
(1 + x)n+1
[dB + 1− (1− η)
n]
}
(10)
and x can be any of µ, µ′, dB is the dark count rate of Bob’s detector. This leads to
Y˜x =
dAdB
1 + x
+
∞∑
n=1
[1− (1− ηA)
n]xn
(1 + x)n+1
[dB + 1− (1− η)
n] (11)
and Y˜x = Yx · Ppost(x) is directly used in Eq.(6), Eq.(7) for calculating the single-photon
counts.
We use the following for the error rate of an n-photon state:
en =
e0dB + ed[1− (1− η)
n]
dB + 1− (1− η)n
(12)
where e0 = 1/2, dB is dark count rate of Bob’s detectors, ed is the probability that the
survived photon hits a wrong detector, which is independent of the transmission distance.
Below we shall assume ed to be a constant. Therefore, the observed Eµ value should be
around
Ex =
e0dB
Yx
+
1
YxPpost(x)
∞∑
n=1
edx
n[1− (1− ηA)
n][1− (1− η)n]
(1 + x)n+1
. (13)
In practical implementation of QKD, we often use the non-degenerated down-conversion to
produce photon pairs, with one photon at the wavelength convenient for detection acting
as heralding signal, and the other falls into the telecommunication windows for optimal
propagation along the fiber or in open air acting as heralded signal. To illustrate the
calculation, we assume the heralding photon is adapted to be 800nm, and the heralded
one to be 1550nm. We shall use these formulas and experimental parameters of GYS as
listed in table I to simulate the observed values Yµ, Yµ′ for Eq.(6,7) and the calculate the
final key rate by Eq.(9).
We can now calculate the final key generation rate with the assumed observed values
above. For convenience of comparing with the result of coherent states, we use the same
parameters as in GYS [31], shown in Table I, and dA = 10
−5. Our simulation results are
shown in Fig. 1, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
Fig. 1 shows with HSPS the key generation rate against transmission distance in the
asymptotic decoy state method and in our practical two decoy state method, we use different
intensity of weak decoy state (µ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10) respectively. From the curves in Fig. 1, we
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FIG. 1: Table1. Experimental parameters in GYS.
Experiment 
 (nm)   dB/km) ed  (%) Y0  B f  (MHz) 
GYS 1550nm 0.21 3.3 1.  0.045 2 
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FIG. 2: Fig1. Final key rates vs transmission distance for decoy state method
with an HSPS source. The black solid line is the ideal result where the frac-
tion of single-photon counts and QBER of single-photon pulses are known exactly.
The dotted lines are the results of our 3-intensity decoy state method with µ =
0.01, 0.05, 0.10, from upper to down. (µ′ has the optimal value at each point.)
can see that our 3-intensity decoy state method can asymptotically approach the theoretical
limit of ideal case.
Fig. 2 shows different key generation rate comparing HSPS (ηA = 0.8) with WCS.
Fig. 3 shows the same objects as in Fig. 2 except with ηA = 0.6.
From these simulations above, we can see that, our proposal can significantly raise the
transmission distance compared with that of coherent states even with imperfect triggering
detector (ηA = 0.6). However, it has a lower key generation rate. The reasons are as follows:
On one hand, in HSPS the dark count probability is so low by Alice’s triggering system,
there the transmission distance is raised, on the other hand, an HSPS is basically a thermal
field which has a higher multi-photon probability than that in Poissonian distribution with
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FIG. 3: Fig2. Comparison of final key rate between a 3-intensity decoy-state protocol with
an HSPS source and the one with a coherent state source. The solid lines are for the ideal
results and the dotted lines are for 3-intensity protocols. The green dotted line represents the
result of an HSPS source (with ηA = 0.8 , µ = 0.05), and the red dotted line represents the
results of a coherent state source (with µ = 0.05). (µ′ has the optimal value at each point.)
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FIG. 4: Fig3. Key rate vs transmission distance. It shows the
same objects as in Fig. 2, but here we have set ηA = 0.6.
the same mean photon number, therefore the key rate is decreased.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARK.
In summary, we have presented a practical decoy state method in quantum key dis-
tribution with a heralded single photon source. By using 3 intensities, 0, µ, µ′, we can
estimate the lower bound of single-photon counts and the upper bound of single-photon
QBER rather tightly. Moreover, our simulation results show that, the transmission distance
of our 3-intensity decoy-state QKD protocol with HSPS is larger than that of with weak
coherence states. Therefore, our 3-intensity decoy state method with HSPS seems to be a
promising candidate in practical implementation of quantum key distribution.
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Caption:
Fig 1. Final key rates vs transmission distance for decoy state method with an HSPS source.
The black solid line is the ideal result where the fraction of single-photon counts and QBER
of single-photon pulses are known exactly. The dotted lines are the results of our 3-intensity
decoy state method with µ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, from upper to down. (µ′ has the optimal value
at each point.)
Fig 2. Comparison of final key rate between a 3-intensity decoy-state protocol with an HSPS
source and the one with a coherent state source. The solid lines are for the ideal results and
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the dotted lines are for 3-intensity protocols. The green dotted line represents the result of an
HSPS source (with ηA = 0.8 , µ = 0.05), and the red dotted line represents the results of a
coherent state source (with µ = 0.05). (µ′ has the optimal value at each point.)
Fig 3. Shows the same objects as in Fig. 2 but here we have set ηA = 0.6.
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